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I don_t quite know how to respond to Jeff McMahan_s critique of my terrorism essay since I
don_t think that I am making the kind of argument he thinks I am making. I do indeed offer
a definition of terrorism, but my definition is meant to apply only to most cases; I don_t
mean to provide an account of what terrorism essentially is. I suppose that I should have
written with more qualifiers, but my intentions, I think, are clear enough. And it is explicitly
Bfrom the perspective of the victims^ that I describe terror as a Btotalizing practice.^ So Jeff
McMahan_s twin assertions about Btruth^ leave me unmoved. I agree with both of them:
It_s not a factual truth that terrorists can_t act for limited ends, and it_s not a conceptual truth
that when they do act for limited ends they are not terrorists. I only want to suggest what
terrorism commonly signifies in the real world – most importantly, what it signifies to the
men and women who are threatened by it. When I look at marginal cases, like the IRA, I try
to show how my suggestion might work in those cases, not to offer a definitive account. I
do believe that Bmost often they [the terrorists] have the totalizing intentions that their
actions signal.^ But not always and not necessarily. The exceptional example doesn_t
bother me, since I am not looking for eternal or necessary truths.
The case is similar with my claim that terrorists make identity the basis of liability,
Band that_s a connection that we are morally bound to resist.^ I mean Bidentity^ as it is
understood in contemporary political discourse – as in Bidentity politics.^ I don_t mean to
rule out all possible connections in all hypothetical worlds or even in the real world.
There are indeed names or titles that we might connect to an individual, and there are
groups to which we might assign him, that are relevant to questions of liability. Doctors
at the site of an accident are liable to different demands and judgments than the rest of
us, but that is because of their profession, not because of their racial, national, or
religious identity. The point of my argument is to distinguish different kinds of groups
and to argue that membership in them has different social and moral implications. It_s not
a conceptual truth that group membership can never make individuals liable to attack.
Liability depends on the character of the group. The primary distinction that I argue for is
between the group of civilians and the group of soldiers or between societies/peoples/
nations/communities and armies. When I say that terrorists target people because of their
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Btheoretical integrity^ of my argument when I also say that soldiers can legitimately be
targeted because of their membership in an army? Only if theoretical integrity and common
sense are radically at odds.
Jeff McMahan asks what I would think if a group of army members who have no
connection to actual warfare – he mentions accountants, lawyers, and doctors; let_s add
cooks, laundrymen, nurses, and clerks – were assembled in an undefended building:
Could we legitimately attack them? I don_t know. If the army regularly brought together
all its non-combat personnel without regard to their actual activities, then I would have to
worry about Jeff McMahan_s question. Since it doesn_t, I don_t. We commonly meet these
people in close relation to the combat-ready soldiers whom they assist, and in that
relationship, they are liable to attack. I should note, though, that medical personnel have
almost always been taken to be immune – ever since the Middle Ages, I believe. They
patch up soldiers and send them back into battle, but they also relieve human suffering,
and under that second description they seem to belong to the larger human community
and not to the army. I take them to be immune too, for that reason, at whatever cost to the
theoretical integrity of my argument.
But if doctors in the army are immune from attack because of what they are doing,
why can_t we also mark out men and women in civilian society who are not immune
because of their activities – if, for example, what they are doing makes them Bmorally
responsible for the initiation or continuation of an unjust war.^ But even for Jeff
McMahan, these civilians are not Busually^ liable to military attack, and that is the only
kind of liability I am writing about. I certainly agree that civilians can be liable to moral
criticism and legal punishment. But the proposition that they can_t Busually^ be attacked
sounds right to me, if what it means is that Jeff McMahan could come up with a
hypothetical case in which we would all want to attack them. I won_t start worrying about
whether there is a significant difference between his Busually^ and my Balways^ until the
hypothetical cases start appearing in the real world.
Back to terrorism: Jeff McMahan thinks that terrorism is a crime of means, not of ends.
But when terrorists aim, let_s say, at the radical subordination of a group of people, surely
they are guilty of a crime of ends. BBut this is contingent,^ says Jeff McMahan, Bit is not a
necessary feature of terrorism.^ I accept that. It is only, as I have said, a common feature –
how common is an empirical question; we would have to look at (real) cases. I also want to
argue, however, that this is the way people under threat experience terrorism and that this
experience ought to weigh heavily in our moral and political judgments about the choice of
terror.
Of course, I do think that there is a close, though certainly contingent, connection between
terrorist means and ends. Jeff McMahan asks, BWhat if the US had not demanded
unconditional surrender but had bombed Japanese cities in order to force a conditional
surrender with guarantees of political and cultural independence for postwar Japan^? Would
this have been terror bombing? My inclination is simply to return the question: Why is this a
hypothetical, rather than an actual, case? Why are the political leaders who plan terrorist
attacks so unlikely to think sympathetically about the Bcultural independence^ of the people
they are attacking? What view of those people underlies the decision to attack them
indiscriminately? I don_t claim that there is a single necessary answer to these questions. But I
do claim that the choice of terror is not simply a strategic choice; it is commonly connected to
larger, and pernicious, moral views and political aims.
I have written a political essay (even though it is being published in a philosophical
journal). My purpose is to argue against all the excuses and apologies that are made for
20 Philosophia (2006) 34:19–21
terrorism and to urge a general condemnation – and then to insist that counter-terrorist
activities meet the same moral standard that we apply, or should apply, to terrorists. Jeff
McMahan doesn_t attempt, and I assume would not want to make, an opposing political
argument. He offers a philosophical critique, which would be entirely appropriate if I had
written a philosophical essay. I don_t mean to say that philosophical standards of
consistency and clarity don_t apply to political essays; they do. I meet them as best I can
and sometimes, no doubt, fail to meet them. But arguments about necessary and contingent
truths and strange hypothetical cases that no real-world actor will ever confront – these are
not useful, it seems to me, in political debate.
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